bmgn | deel 125 -1 | 48 -55 conducted themselves in a more 'responsible' fashion since the peacekeeping disasters that befell them and the local citizenry in those three places (274) (275) .
In trying to address tentatively this question of why there have been no more such crises, it makes sense first to deal with the extent to which the three affairs themselves really can be considered similar, beyond just being three peacekeeping disasters. At first glance, the differences seem just as great as that similarity. What went wrong in all three was not quite the same.
The Somalia crisis centered about the death in 1993 of two young citizens at the hands of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, one of whom was tortured to death. In Rwanda ten Belgian peacekeeping paratroopers were murdered by locals in 1994, whereupon the Belgian government withdrew the rest of its national contingent to the un peacekeeping force and Hutus turned to murdering Tutsis in genocidal numbers, and in Srebrenica the Netherlands peacekeeping battalion, Dutch-iii was unable to prevent in 1995 the murder of eight thousand Muslim men by Bosnian-Serb troops in a un enclave. 
From peacekeeping to peace enforcement at the Cold War's end
Undoubtedly, these three fiascos are similar in that they all lead to domestic political dramas in the three troop-sending countries with similar characteristics. All three entailed 'dramatic and morally freighted events that placed political and military systems under heavy pressure' in Ottawa, Brussels and The Hague. They also consisted of 'a series of bigger and smaller crises, attempts at damage control and inquiries'. Finally, in all three cases, the aftermath was 'lengthy and left many with the feeling of not having been satisfied ' (12) . Comparing how the three affairs played out as domestic political crises is largely what this engrossing and well-written book is about.
Internationally, these three operations also fit into a pattern; this would probably have merited inclusion in this book. Right after the end of the Cold War peacekeeping operations were rapidly multiplying. The numbers are quite striking. Between 1988 and 1993 the un Security Council established no fewer than 14 new peacekeeping operations, as many as had been created in the previous forty years. With the deadlock at the un broken it seemed like a golden age of international peacekeeping might have been dawning. This was an especially exciting prospect to many Canadians, who had taken pride in their country's contributions and had even begun to derive a part of the national identity and international image from them. One just has to look the peacekeeping monument that was built in downtown Ottawa in 1992 or the bereted peacekeeper that appears today on the back of a Canadian ten-dollar bill.
But at the same time, the nature of peacekeeping was changing, too.
More and more the operations were responses not to interstate conflict, but to internal conflicts in what later came to be called 'failed or failing states' -like Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The most challenging peacekeeping operation the un had undertaken until the 1990s, namely in the Congo in 1961-1963 was as a result of internal conflict. But for a long time it was an exception. Operations in failed or failing states were far more ambitious, difficult, and dangerous. In classical peacekeeping situations, disciplined national armed forces of the former belligerents, usually sovereign states (Egyptians and Israelis, Indians and Pakistanis, etc.) generally could be expected to respect both the truce that had been negotiated and the peacekeeping forces sent to monitor compliance with it. For that reason, 'trucekeeping' sometimes has been suggested as a better term than 'peacekeeping' in these classical situations. Moreover, these national armed forces usually could be separated, returned to their national territories and enjoined to remain within certain demarcation lines and national boundaries. So if Canadians were not inherently good at peacekeeping, they nonetheless undoubtedly were very good at it because of the quality of the military peacekeepers they sent.
In other words, the military's crimes and misdeeds in Somalia seemed to threaten the myth of Canada as the international peacekeeper par excellence.
The Canadian government felt obliged to demonstrate that the military had been purified so that it could regain its status; the most symbolically visible 
The Balkans and the ongoing lag in thinking about peacekeeping
The lag in thinking about how international peacekeeping had changed, that is, fully coming to grips with how fundamentally difficult peacekeeping was in failed and failing states, would continue to afflict the Canadian government even after Somalia. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled into Zaire, where they were vulnerable to attacks by Zairian Tutsis and Zairian rebel forces under Laurent Kabila. The Canadian government decided to try to prod the international community into action.
No doubt this was motivated in large part by sincere worries about the Hutus and the conviction that this time they should not be abandoned by the international community. But it was also an opportunity for Canada to reestablish its peacekeeping bona fides, at home and abroad in the wake of the discussiedossier 53 recent mess in Somalia. Ottawa went so far as to offer to lead an un-sponsored peacekeeping force in Zaire-Rwanda, an offer that the un Security Council took up in a November 1996 resolution. Where Belgium had failed, perhaps Canada would succeed.
But it was another mess. Canadian forces were sent to Rwanda-Zaire, to take up their leadership roles. But they were soon withdrawn. Ottawa had completely miscalculated the difficulty of intervention and Canadian politicians had overestimated its own military's capacity to lead a difficult mission. An internal defence department review concluded that the Canadian military suffered from 'systemic inability' to organize swiftly for the overseas emergency deployment of personnel and equipment. The incident is still being taught about and studied at Canadian military educational institutions, where it is known as 'the bungle in the jungle'. The un operation itself was canceled. Fortunately, the feared recurrence of genocide did not happen as the Hutus were able to flee. And so the events were little noted publicly in Canada.
It was in the Balkans that Canada was forced fully to come to grips with how international peacekeeping had become international peace enforcement, although the lag in thinking did not disappear at first. Canadian forces first entered the region as peacekeepers in 1992. There were soon charges being made that the Canadian government sought to shield the public from knowing how violent the Yugoslav commitments had become, how many 
No more 'affairs'
In the epilogue, Dr. Klep also aptly comments that new-style peace enforcement missions 'to a great extent are unpredictable and often riskier than originally thought' and he points to the Dutch participation in ISAF:
Instead of being able to dedicate itself, as hoped, to reconstruction, the Netherlands contingent in Southern Afghanistan found itself quickly caught up in a tough and dangerous guerilla war met Taliban fighters. The Canadian isaf contingent had the same experience (270).
Yet there have been no more 'affairs'. This is not to say that there have not been lengthy and heated debates in both Canada and the Netherlands about It may be that with the old model of blue-bereted peacekeeping fading, we just are not shocked as much anymore when some things go wrong. Given the difficulties and dangers our forces face in modern peace enforcement, that is no doubt a reasonable stance.
Because Klep was so cautious in his epilogue over why there have been no more peacekeeping 'affairs' and whether this may be at all attributable to the three countries having learned the lessons of Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebenica, it would be useful to hear from him on these two matters.
One final point. The focus of Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica is, of course, how the three crises played out as domestic political dramas. There were special inquiries established in all three countries. Klep writes that in all three, the inquiries and their final reports were 'highjacked' by governments, the media, or other outsiders. Having adopted such a loaded term as 'highjacked' that implies illegitimacy or a dysfunctional political system, Klep should defend it. To be sure, the reports were not always used 'as intended' by the NORAD, 1957 -2007 . A History (2007 Canada and International Peacekeeping (1995) . Email: jockel@stlawu.edu. 
